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Abstract
Auditing standards require an auditor to make various enquiries about liabilities in general this may entail
consideration of potential litigations and claims that the audited entity may be facing. To perform this part of
audit, the auditors will generally seek representation letters from lawyers of the company detailing an estimate
prepared by management, confirmed by their lawyers through a representation letter, and then sent directly to
the auditors.
This paper reviews the implications for the auditing profession of a case that involved auditors seeking such
representation letters. The case involves litigation between the Westpac Banking Corporation and 789TEN Pty
Ltd. While the Westpac case confirmed the legal position of the auditor in their task of collecting evidence in
order to form an opinion in Australia, it highlights a significant anomaly under the law and should place the
issue of solicitor’s representation letters as audit evidence firmly on the agenda of policymakers.
This issue of the compromise of legal privilege during the conduct of an audit is also not confined to Australia:
other common law jurisdictions, such as the UK and the US, have also sought to clarify the position of
auditors when issues of the integrity of legal privacy privilege arise.
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Abstract 
Auditing standards require an auditor to make various enquiries about liabilities in general 
this may entail consideration of potential litigations and claims that the audited entity may be 
facing. To perform this part of audit, the auditors will generally seek representation letters 
from lawyers of the company detailing an estimate prepared by management, confirmed by 
their lawyers through a representation letter, and then sent directly to the auditors.  
This paper reviews the implications for the auditing profession of a case that involved 
auditors seeking such representation letters. The case involves litigation between the Westpac 
Banking Corporation and 789TEN Pty Ltd. While the Westpac case confirmed the legal 
position of the auditor in their task of collecting evidence in order to form an opinion in 
Australia, it highlights a significant anomaly under the law and should place the issue of 
solicitor’s representation letters as audit evidence firmly on the agenda of policymakers.  
This issue of the compromise of legal privilege during the conduct of an audit is also not 
confined to Australia: other common law jurisdictions, such as the UK and the US, have also 
sought to clarify the position of auditors when issues of the integrity of legal privacy 
privilege arise.  
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Auditing standards prescribe both the principles and essential procedures that govern the 
audit process and the professional conduct of an auditor. In Australia, these standards carry 
the force of law when undertaking an audit under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
Australian Auditing Standards (ASA) require an auditor to make various enquiries about 
liabilities in general—this may entail consideration of potential litigations and claims that the 
audited entity may be facing. The auditors are required to enquire about all material legal 
matters and consider their possible impact on assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses. 
Auditors also have to ensure that the entity follows adequate accounting treatment of 
contingent liabilities along with ensuring appropriate disclosure in financial statements. To 
perform this part of an audit, the auditors will generally seek representation letters from 
lawyers of the company detailing an estimate prepared by management (confirmed by their 
lawyers) and then sent directly to the auditors.  
This paper reviews the implications for the auditing profession of a case that involved 
auditors seeking such a representation letter. The case was initially heard in the New South 
Wales (NSW) Supreme Court and appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal
2
 with respect to the 
litigation between Westpac Banking Corporation and 789TEN Pty Ltd. The substantive 
litigation between the parties concerned a claim by 789TEN against Westpac for the removal 
of money from 789TEN’s accounts with the bank without proper approval.  
While the Westpac case confirmed the legal position of the auditor in their task of 
collecting evidence in order to form an opinion in Australia, it highlights a significant 
anomaly under the law and should place the issue of solicitor’s representation letters as audit 
evidence firmly on the agenda of policymakers.  
The paradox for auditors is that in order to perform their duties with the requisite care 
and skill of a professional required by auditing standards they are required to collect 
sufficient and appropriate evidence to form their opinion. However, in the course of gathering 
this evidence, when it entails solicitor’s representation letters, auditors may compromise legal 
privacy privilege and as such adversely affect the litigation risk of the client. One solution 
would be not to gather this evidence in this way, however auditing standards mandate the 
appropriate procedures to collect evidence corroborating management assertions regarding 
litigation and claims under ASA 502 Audit Evidence – Specific Considerations for Litigation 
and Claims. Alternative, less reliable procedures may raise questions regarding the 
independence of the auditor or potentially open the way for litigation against the auditor. 
This issue of the compromise of legal privilege during the conduct of an audit is not 
confined to Australia. Other common law jurisdictions, such as the UK and the US, have also 
sought to clarify the position of auditors when issues of legal privacy privilege arise. The 
Westpac case in Australia and similar developments internationally highlight the critical 
nature of this issue and create an urgency for the appropriate authorities to clarify the position 
for auditors in respect of legal privilege. 
This paper differs from other accounts of this case (e.g. Fairweather & Barker 2006; 
Law Council of Australia 2010) as it examines legal privilege through an auditor’s lens 
demonstrated through the case concerning Westpac’s application to prevent 789TEN to gain 
access to documents passing between Westpac’s solicitors and its auditors. It highlights the 
structural impediments under the law for auditors. One the one hand, the law mandates 
through the auditing standards that information regarding litigation and claims must be 
collected and that externally-generated evidence (evidence gathered from sources other than 
the client) is more reliable. On the other hand, the law has confirmed that this process 
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constitutes a breach of legal privacy privilege essentially making this information ‘public’ 
and available to adverse parties in litigation. 
2. Case particulars  
The substantive case was initiated when 789TEN Pty Ltd (789TEN) sued Westpac Banking 
Corporation (Westpac) for a breach of authority or mandate regarding the payment of certain 
funds from its bank account held with Westpac. The bank denied responsibility for allowing 
the payment to be processed. 
During the proceedings of this case, 789TEN’s solicitors issued a subpoena for the 
production of documents including documents from Westpac to Henry Davis York (HDY) 
(Westpac’s solicitors) requesting them to communicate directly with Westpac’s auditors, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (a typical form of solicitor’ representation letter) and secondly the 
letters of response from HDY to the Westpac’s auditors (the audit letters). These audit letters 
dealt with the Westpac’s liability in terms of the 789TEN litigation and the estimate by 
Westpac’s solicitors HDY regarding the financial settlement that may be incurred by Westpac 
as a result of the litigation.  
Westpac sought an order from court to prevent 789TEN from accessing the audit letters 
on the basis that they were subject to legal professional privilege under the Evidence Act 
1995 (NSW) (Evidence Act). To succeed, Westpac had to establish that the audit letters were a 
confidential communication or document and that the dominant purpose of the audit letters 
was either the provision of legal advice to it, in its capacity as a client (‘legal advice 
privilege’ under section 118 of the Evidence Act) and/or the provision of professional legal 
services to it, in its capacity as a client, relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding 
(‘litigation privilege’ under section 119 of the Evidence Act (Newman 2002)). 
Section 118 of the Evidence Act headed as ‘legal advice’ provides: 
“Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that 
adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: 
(a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or 
(b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the 
client; or 
(c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by 
the client or a lawyer; 
for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing 
legal advice to the client.” 
Section 119 of the Evidence Act  headed as ‘litigation’ provides: 
“Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that 
adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: 
(a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or 
between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made; or 
(b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was 
prepared; 
for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal 
services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the 
proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas 
proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party.” 




2.1 Decision at First Instance: Trial Judge3 
Without much dispute, the trial judge, Bergin J, accepted that the letters were confidential 
documents. However, her honour was not satisfied that the letters were privileged 
communications under the Evidence Act. Two issues were considered in this conclusion. 
First, whether the letters were prepared for the dominant purpose of HDY in providing legal 
advice to the bank, and second, whether the bank’s auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 
were agents of Westpac to receive the legal advice so provided.  
Justice Bergin found that the dominant purpose of the letters was not to provide legal 
advice to Westpac but to enable the Westpac’s auditors to know whether the director’s 
estimate of a possible settlement figure could be relied upon. This would assist Westpac’s 
auditors to audit the financial statements of Westpac and its controlled entities and hence did 
not satisfy the dominant purpose criteria.  
Also, based on her reference of auditor independence requirements under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (hereinafter Corporations Act), Justice Bergin rejected any 
agency relationship between the Westpac’s solicitors and its auditors. As a consequence, the 
audit letters did not satisfy the purposes protected by the Evidence Act either under the legal 
advice privilege or litigation privilege. 
2.2 NSW Court of Appeal4 
The Court of Appeal agreed with Justice Bergin that the auditors were not the agents of 
Westpac for the purpose of receiving the letter from Westpac’s lawyers. There was no 
evidence of agency agreement between Westpac and its auditors or that the auditors were 
appointed by Westpac to obtain information from its lawyers. The bank only authorised its 
lawyers to provide the required information to its auditors. The auditors used the information 
only for the purpose of performing its obligations under the Corporations Act with respect to 
the audit process. 
Thus, the Court of Appeal supported the decision of the primary judge and concluded 
that s118 of the Evidence Act did not protect the letters.  
The Court of Appeal again agreed with the decision of the trial judge on the matter of 
litigation privilege, in rejecting the application of s119 of the Evidence Act.  
The court found that the dominant purpose of Westpac was not to seek legal advice of 
their lawyers in regards to the director’s estimate of Westpac’s contingent liability. It insisted 
that the Westpac’s auditors PwC required the solicitor’s representation letter, which could 
only be provided with Westpac’s authorisation, for the purpose of carrying out its audit 
obligations. Thus, the court was satisfied that the evidence established that the letters would 
have been prepared irrespective of any intention on the part of Westpac to be provided with 
the legal opinion. 
2.3 Application for Special Leave to Appeal to the High Court of Australia5 
Westpac submitted to the High Court that the matter was of such public importance and the 
decision might result in that any litigant, who is subject to audit, can be required to produce 
documents which may disclose both the company’s own view of its prospects in the litigation 
and the view of its solicitors. The Court of Appeal had also acknowledged this potential 
problem.  
Westpac also asked the High Court to review the narrow view of Court of Appeal in 
defining ‘professional legal service’. However, the court noted that: 
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What was the dominant purpose for obtaining the letters for which legal 
professional privilege was claimed in this matter is essentially a question of fact. 
No point of general principle would conveniently fall for decision if the matter were 
special leave to be granted and there are in any event insufficient prospects of 
success to warrant a grant of special leave.
6
 
Leave to appeal to the High Court was not granted. 789TEN was subsequently granted access 
to the documents on the basis of the decision from the NSW Court of Appeal.  
3. Implications of the Decision 
It was forcefully argued in the application to the High Court by Westpac’s lawyers that if the 
decision as taken by the courts in the case were to stand, it would encourage as a standard 
practice in litigation against companies that were audited, the issuing of subpoena to an 
entity’s auditor for the production of documents, such as were sought in this case. This 
situation would not be conducive to a fair hearing of matters in this type of litigation where 




Such disclosure of details or estimates of the financial implications anticipated by the 
company with respect to the litigation for auditing purposes may affect the course of 
litigation. The disclosed estimate might vary from the amount the company might have 
offered to settle the matter thus making settlement negotiations more difficult.  
Though the Court of Appeal recognised the problem and suggested legislative 
intervention as a possible remedy, at the same time the Court was not in favour of legislative 
change that would extend the rationale underpinning legal privilege or which would be 
different to that applying under general law with respect to litigation privilege. 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned difficulties, audited entities cannot instruct their 
solicitors not to provide information about actual or pending litigation as required by their 
auditors so as to preserve the privileged nature of that information. This would result in the 
financial statements being subject to comment by the auditors or possibly result in the issue 
of a modified audit opinion.  
4. Auditing Litigation Contingencies 
The Australian Auditing Standards carry the force of law
8
 under the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) and require auditors to collect ‘sufficient and appropriate evidence’ to verify the 
authenticity of claims by management. These include, among other things, assertions about 
liabilities and contingency or litigation reserves, current and likely litigation, enforcement 
matters and claims as well as legal advice provided about regulatory and transactional 
matters. The Westpac case demonstrates the difficult position of the auditor where the 
auditor’s investigation fails to protect the integrity of legal privacy privilege. The situation 
gives rise to the possibility of information collected by the auditor in the course of the audit 
being subpoenaed by adverse parties involved in litigation, as was the case here, and places 
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the client in a disadvantageous position in that action. Legal judgements
9
 against auditors 
clearly demonstrate that the most basic standard of “reasonable care and skill” expected of 
auditors is “adherence to professional standards in all aspects of an audit” (Gay & Simnett 
2010, p. 152). 
While some discussion has occurred on the implications of this case from legal 
perspective (see for example Newman 2002), the perspective adopted here examines the 
implications through the auditor’s lens, to demonstrate how the Westpac decision might 
affect the auditor’s ability to gather sufficient and appropriate evidence and hence provide 
assurance as to whether the financial reports present a ‘true and fair view’ of an entity’s 
wealth and progress. 
4.1 Evidence Collection and Evaluation 
According to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), it is the client’s responsibility to prepare 
financial statements which present a ‘true and fair view’ of the state of affairs of the company 
in all material respects. It is the auditor who verifies the management claims and forms an 
opinion based on his/her collection of sufficient appropriate audit evidence. However, certain 
relevant audit evidence can only be obtained from the work of outside experts, as the auditors 
cannot corroborate certain management assertions without making such enquiries.  
The Australian Auditing Standard (ASA 502) explicitly requires that an auditor 
ascertains and confirms contingent liabilities arising from pending legal matters and other 
actions against an entity. An important step in this process is to request that management send 
a letter of inquiry to the entity’s lawyers, seeking comments on a list of pending or threatened 
litigation during the period, in order to acquire the requisite sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence. While these legal representation letters are prepared by management, a copy of the 
response is sent directly to the auditor to increase the reliability of the evidence. This 
response (or solicitor’s representation letter) is an important facet in the evidence gathering 
exercise as it provides evidence as to the completeness of management assertions relating to 
liabilities arising from legal matters (Gay & Simnett 2010). The Standard (ASA 502) further 
states that in case the auditor experiences a limitation of scope through an inability to obtain 
evidence directly from solicitors, he/she may need to consider modifying the audit opinion. 
Although the Standard asks the auditors to consider whether alternative audit procedures can 
provide further audit evidence, it maintains that if the auditor still considers it insufficient or 
inappropriate, they should modify the audit opinion accordingly.  
Auditors are left in the difficult situation that by complying with auditing standards they 
might breach their client’s legal privacy privilege. However, failing to follow the standards 
leaves auditors open to litigation themselves. Following the auditing standards has been the 
minimum standard for professional competence in exercising reasonable care and skill.
10
 
Negligence claims against auditors arise from failing to adhere to professional standards (Gay 
& Simnett 2010). However, as the Westpac case demonstrates, another segment of law, the 
Evidence Act and the case law that relies on its provisions, do not provide sufficient 
protection to auditors’ work product to ensure appropriate access to required information 
without causing any undue harm either to the client or to its solicitors. 
If disclosure of sensitive information to third party lawyers as a result of the audit 
process becomes commonplace then it will place audit clients in a situation in which they 
must choose between their right to confidential legal counsel and their responsibility and 
interest in cooperating fully with auditors to ensure appropriate accounting records and 
stakeholder confidence (Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) in Wong 2006). Thus, if 
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they decide to withhold information from auditors, they may have to forego a ‘clean’ or 
unmodified audit report.  
The issue of the request of privileged information by auditors and it being subpoenaed 
by third parties is not new. However, in the past, attempts to intrude into the lawyer-
accountant communications through solicitor’s representation letters were rare. Erbstoesser 
and Matson (2003) suggest that this might be out of the traditional respect for the 
confidentiality of communications to which these professions were routinely participants. 
More recently, it has become increasingly common for adverse party lawyers to seek access 
to this type of information (McKenna 2008), and the Westpac judgment clearly opens the 
door for parties engaged in civil litigation against companies that have a commercial or 
statutory obligation to communicate with their auditors or regulatory authorities about their 
financial position to obtain access to sensitive information (Pickering 2008). 
4.2 Auditor Independence and Work-Product Privilege 
During the court proceedings the trial judge made reference to auditor independence 
requirements required under the Corporations Act and rejected any agency relationship 
between Westpac’s solicitors and its auditors. This raises concerns as to whether auditor 
independence requirements safeguard audit quality or thwart the auditor work-product 
privilege.  
This increased risk of exposure of audit work to third parties underlines a contradiction: 
the auditing standards, as noted above, carry the force of law in Australia under the 
Corporations Act, and require the auditors to gather such evidence from external experts 
when required. Further, evidence gathered from external sources directly by the auditors is 
considered higher quality and safeguards the independence of the auditor, which is also 
required under the Corporations Act. However, in doing so, the auditor compromises legal 
privacy privilege, and maintaining independence therefore potentially comes at the price of 
either an unmodified opinion or a disadvantage in commercial litigation. 
4.3 Legislative Change or Auditing Standards Guidance 
Justice Tobias (Court of Appeal Judge) indicated the denial of privilege for the solicitor 
representation letters would have a deleterious practical consequence as such letters were a 
necessary incident in an audit process.
11
 Thus it would be more likely than not that a prudent 
auditor will require confirmation of management assertions regarding contingent liabilities 
from the company’s solicitors, and that such information would be provided directly to the 
auditor. He therefore rejected the primary judge’s suggestion where it was proposed that audit 
clients should prepare the letters excluding the privileged material because it is the privileged 
material that the auditors require.  
However, despite the recognition of the problem highlighted in the courts through the 
Westpac case, nothing more than a suggestion to consider legislative change has resulted, 
along with the warning that legal privacy privilege should not be extended beyond its original 
rationale. There has been no guidance either by the courts, or by regulators or by the auditing 
profession about the way in which the auditors can ensure continuous availability of 
information required for the audit in respect of litigation and claims without compromising 
clients’ legal rights. 
If legislative changes are not made, or auditing standards in relation to the sufficiency 
and appropriateness of evidence regarding litigation and contingencies are not altered, then 
any client with litigation contingencies that wishes them to remain confidential risks a 
modified opinion due to a scope limitation. 
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The Westpac case also raises the question as to whether such a form of external evidence 
(solicitor representation letters) is the only means by which the auditor can verify 
management claims regarding litigation. If the auditors instead rely on internal evidence then 
it further raises other concerns such as: is there any other internal evidence such as solicitor’s 
direct communication with the clients available to the auditors and which can be considered 
sufficient and appropriate audit evidence? If yes, does disclosure to the auditor compromise 
legal privilege? Is any internal evidence as persuasive as the externally gathered solicitor’s 
representation letters?  If no, does that mean that any such internal evidence should not be 
relied upon in relation to litigation and claims? If yes, does the auditor need to provide further 
evidence if such internal evidence is subject to adequate internal controls to ensure its 
appropriateness, accuracy and objectivity?  
5. Auditing Litigation Contingencies 
It is important to ensure a free flow of information between a business and its auditors in 
order to successfully verify the management claims in the financial statements, especially in 
respect of verifying litigation contingencies. However, any decision that breaks the privilege 
of protection of information, which is sensitive but at the same time is vital in the audit 
verification process, might discourage audit clients from providing all relevant information to 
the auditors.  
As noted earlier, the issue of the request of privileged information by auditors and it 
compromising legal privacy privilege is not new. Reviewing the recent progress on this issue 
in both the US and UK, it is clear that there has been little in the way of a reasoned or 
cohesive approach by way of response from the courts or from the legal or accounting 
professions. 
5.1 US position on privileged information and audit evidence 
 “Eroding the auditor and attorney-client privilege will] chill communications 
between companies and their accountants and punish those who cooperate fully 
with their auditors.” 
   Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) in Wong (2006) 
A number of legal cases in the US have raised concerns over the scope of the so-called 
‘auditor privilege’. It remains inconclusive in the US as to whether the records turned over to 
auditors, including sensitive legal documents, are for the eyes of the auditor only, or whether 
they can be subpoenaed by third parties (Reisigner 2006).   
In 1989, both the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and 
American Bar Association (ABA) issued new commentaries to guide their respective 
professions about lawyer’s letters (solicitor’s representation letters in Australia) to auditors. 
The ABA maintained that any disclosure of privileged information to the auditors, either by 
the client or counsel, does not waive privilege. In addition, it clarified that any such non-
waiver statement does not in any way interfere with the standards and procedures of the 
accounting profession in the auditing process. The AICPA then confirmed this stance of ABA 
by addressing this non-waiver issue through an interpretation of Statements on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) 12 Inquiry of a client's lawyer concerning litigation, claims, and 
assessments (AU Section 337, updated June 2009) (AICPA, 2009). 
Notwithstanding the pronouncements of these authorities, subsequent decisions in the 
US courts have been inconsistent. Some have decided that the work-product doctrine 




precludes the discovery of audit reports.
12
 According to these courts, audit reports are not 
prepared in the ordinary course of business, but are prepared only because of the litigation 
and hence the work-product doctrine restricts their discovery. Some other US courts however 
found that the audit reports are not attorney work product and hence the work product does 
not apply
13
 (Barrett 2005).  
A case from Texas, AES Wolf Hollow v. The Shaw Group (2005), Inc., reinforced 
concerns regarding this issue by allowing third party access to auditor privileged documents. 
Following almost a year of debate and deliberation, the Texas Supreme Court overturned 
Shaw’s confidentiality and allowed AES access to Shaw’s financial records in May 2006. A 
subsequent motion for rehearing by Shaw was also denied. 
The once most obvious ground for protection of a lawyer’s communication, the 
attorney-client privilege, is not viable for restricting discovery of lawyer’s letters when 
information is disclosed to a third party, including auditors. Some States in the US recognise 
an accountant-client privilege and maintain that a disclosure, in itself is privileged, and does 
not constitute a waiver. Although this might be relief in at least some jurisdictions, it is 
limited in operation as no such accountant-client privilege is recognised in US Federal 
proceedings (Erbstoesser and Matson 2003). 
More recently, the Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) and the ABA formed a task 
force (Task Force) to reinforce their efforts to protect the attorney-client and auditor 
privilege. Reisigner (2006) outlines the various solutions being proposed by the Task Force. 
First, the idea of a ‘limited waiver’ to auditors was offered in an attempt to address this issue. 
However, since the majority of courts had earlier rejected this defense, concluding that any 
waiver of privilege to one party waives the privilege to all parties, making the information 
‘fair game’ in discovery. Second, the Task Force proposed to forward the idea of ‘common 
interest doctrine’ whereby the auditors and their clients would not be adversaries, but would 
share a common interest in accurate financial reporting. The case of Merrill Lynch & Co. v. 
Allegheny Energy Inc.
14
 saw a successful application of this doctrine. Finally, the Task Force 
sought to convince the regulators, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to set tighter guidelines on what auditors 
should ask to see, including privileged information, from their clients. However the PCAOB 
did not appreciate the proposition that they should tell the auditors not to look for certain 
records (Reisinger 2006).  
It remains worth contemplating that while other authorities are increasingly concerned 
about this issue, the issuance of AICPA auditing interpretations in July 2007, despite 
providing extensive guidance on how to interpret lawyer responses to auditors, did not 
provide any guidance on how to ensure the protection of privacy of the information provided 
in lawyer response letters. The interpretation does consider the possibility of inclusion of 
specific non-waiver statements as a possible rescue option (AU Section 9337, June 2009 
revisions). However based on past court decisions, this is not an option that an audit client 
could rely upon. 
Despite the attempts by various authorities in the US to address the privacy privilege 
issues concerning the attorney-client privilege and the auditors, the 2007 case of United 
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States v. Textron, Inc. et. al
15
, has reaffirmed the problem. Among other issues, the case 
involved privacy issues when Textron disclosed its tax workpapers to its independent auditor, 
Ernst & Young (EY), to assist EY in determining whether Textron’s contingent tax liability 
reserves satisfied Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The District Court 
concluded that Textron’s tax workpapers were correctly protected by the ‘attorney work 
product’ doctrine, but the case was subsequently being appealed in the United States Court of 
Appeal (Segal 2009).  
The Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) and The Chamber of Commerce of United 
States of America (The Chamber) released a supporting document in favour of Textron Inc. 
and urged the Court of Appeal to decline the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) attempt to 
access the privileged information in April 2008. They maintain that such an action would 
discourage prudent corporate conduct and would punish companies that turn to their lawyers 
for assistance in the realities of running a modern business. This document reinforced 
concerns which might arise from such decisions as this strategy might become a matter of 
policy in other similar situations. Additionally it argued that a company’s honest revelations 
to auditors being open to scrutiny by all adverse parties, as well as the fear of the extension of 
this waiver of privilege to include all other privileged communications and information 
regarding litigation, not just the information required in the audit (Segal 2009). 
In addition, the Task Force made explicit its intentions to forward a protocol by August 
of 2008 with an aim to encourage auditors as well as regulators to clarify what information 
auditors can legitimately expect to access and maintain the integrity of the legal privacy 
privilege. However, at the time of writing there remains no resolution.  
5.2 UK position on privileged information and audit evidence 
In recent years, in an effort to improve the reliability of audit evidence available to auditors, 
the UK regulators have reinforced the statutory duties of directors and employees to provide 
relevant audit information. In particular, the provisions of the Companies (Audit, 
Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 strengthened the rights of auditors. 
However, some concerns still remain regarding the information held by third parties, 
especially lawyers, who are entitled to legal professional privilege. Thus, tensions arise when 
privileged information, although material to the truth and fairness of financial statements, 
might be withheld from the auditors (Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and 
Wales (ICAEW) 2007). 
The UK standard, ISA (UK and Ireland) 500 Audit Evidence, defines audit evidence as 
all the information used by auditors in arriving at the conclusions on which the audit opinion 
is based. Similar to most jurisdictions, it makes a broad generalisation that audit evidence is 
more reliable when it is obtained from independent sources outside the company.  
In addition ISA (UK and Ireland) 501 Audit Evidence (Additional Considerations for 
Specific Items (Part B)) provides standards and guidance to auditors with respect to audit 
procedures for litigation and claims provisions and disclosures. Auditors are required to carry 
out procedures to verify any litigation and claims involving the entity, and which can have 
material affect on the financial statements. In so doing the auditor can engage in direct 
communication with the entity’s legal counsel, in the form of a letter addressed to the counsel 
by the board. 
However as it currently stands, the right of persons or organisations to consult a lawyer 
in confidence is held to represent a higher public interest need than the right of shareholders, 
markets or society as a whole to benefit from true and fair financial statements (ICAEW 
2007). Consequently, the audit files (or workpapers) do not enjoy legal professional privilege.   
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The AQF working committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and 
Wales (ICAEW) (2007) highlighted this contradiction. On one hand the lawyers are required 
to respect their client’s right to privilege and hence not allow their client’s interests to be 
undermined by inappropriate disclosure of privileged information. On the other hand they 
should not recommend to the board or individual directors to take any course of action that is 
likely to lead to a breach of the duties to prepare ‘true and fair’ financial statements, or a 
failure to ensure the provision of relevant information to auditors. As such, despite the fact 
that the communication of privileged information could jeopardise the privileged nature of 
advice, it does not absolve the directors from their responsibility to ensure that the auditor has 
access to relevant audit evidence.  
This issue was canvassed in the House of Lords in the debate over the Companies 
(Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Bill in 2004 when Lord Razzall pointed 
out that if auditors are prevented from obtaining relevant privileged information then there 
shall be endless company reports where the auditors would be required to qualify (modify) 
the accounts as they were unable to form an opinion regarding whether the financial 
statements present a true and fair view. However, it appears from that discussion that in the 
absence of any legal authority, the Lords believe that the disclosure of any such information 
to auditors in order for them to form a true and fair view would not prejudice the matter to 
which the information is related as the auditor need not publicise it to any other party (Lord 
Sharman in Lords Debates 2004). 
However, the Lords missed the possibility of such information being subpoenaed by the 
adverse party to the litigation. In addition, it was not taken into account that UK law does not 
privilege the work of the auditor. Despite the identification of the potential for modified 
opinions, the current UK Companies Act (2006) has no provisions which provide protection 
to a claim for legal professional privilege which could be maintained in legal proceedings 
(ICAEW 2007). 
Apparently this matter is still on the agenda in the UK as a recent Exposure Draft: ISA 
501 (Redrafted) has proposed that it should be made clearer in paragraph 11 (b) that the 
auditor would need to modify the opinion in the auditor’s report if a scope limitation with 
regards to litigation and claims exists.  
A legislative change to protect legal professional privilege has also been proposed by the 
working group of Audit Quality Fundamentals . It hopes that some reform can be introduced 
into law so that, rather than the access of auditors to privileged information being restricted, 
auditors should be included within the scope of privilege. Their proposal extends to not only 
that the auditor’s access is unrestricted, but the resulting audit working papers are also 
privileged and auditors would be subject to equivalent prohibitions on the disclosure of such 
information as would apply to lawyers. However, in the meantime it has been documented 
that auditors should not be held responsible for any instance of audit failure which may result 
from the impact of legal professional privilege on the availability of audit information 
(ICAEW 2007). 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The Westpac v 789TEN Pty Ltd case clearly demonstrates the current Australian position of 
the protection of legal privacy privilege when the Court of Appeal rejected the claims of 
Westpac that a solicitor representation letter to the auditor is privileged. The subsequent 
failure to grant leave to appeal to the High Court on this issue highlights that under current 
law, the matter is settled. 
Arens et al. (2010) outline the conflicts that might arise owing to different 
responsibilities of lawyers and auditors with respect to common clients. They explain that 




whereas the auditors are responsible for determining adequate disclosure in financial 
statements, the lawyers are responsible for ‘winning the case’. As such many lawyers, for the 
fear of losing confidentiality and prejudicing the client’s defense claim, might provide a ‘less 
than candid’ response to the auditor (Peters 2006).  
It is well-known to auditors that some lawyers may view the prospects of success in 
litigation with ‘rose tinted glasses’ (Peters 2006), and hence provide an unreasonably 
optimistic comment about a claim. To protect auditors from being held accountable for 
reliance on unsatisfactory solicitor responses, the provisions of ASA 508 as a whole provide 
that the auditors are entitled to expect responses from lawyers not to be wrong, false or 
misleading and deceptive. However, the issue of the protection of the privileged nature of 
these communications is critical for the auditor in both maintaining their independence and 
the integrity of the audit. 
Verifying litigation and claims requires auditors to rely on the work of legal experts and 
obtain solicitors’ representation letters, however by providing this information, clients’ legal 
privacy privilege is compromised. The implications of the decision in the case of Westpac 
Banking Corporation v. 789TEN Pty Ltd leaves a rather important unresolved issue for the 
auditing profession. Australian authorities (both legal and accounting) have not made any real 
progress toward a satisfactory resolution of this issue.  
In June 2006 a meeting of the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) 
considered a Board Summary Paper which identified issues concerning the need for guidance 
to address the issue of legal privacy privilege in the audit process. However, the AUASB 
argued that in the wake of uncertainties surrounding the Westpac decision, it was unable to 
determine a suitable form and content of audit guidance in this regard. It concluded by 
forwarding the idea of seeking legislative intervention as a preferred option and proposed to 
draft a letter to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (Parker 2006). However, 
despite this issue being ‘on the table’ and amendments being proposed in 2009 to the 
Corporations Act under the Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Bill 
2010 via a new section (310A), no regulatory
16
 or professional action has followed. 
Additionally, Australian regulators and professional bodies are not alone in struggling 
with this conflict. Evidence from the US and the UK demonstrates that this issue is likely a 
global problem requiring leadership from influential international standard-setting bodies. 
The case of Westpac v. 789TEN Pty Ltd highlights an important contradiction for 
auditors. Auditors are required under the Corporations Act to collect ‘sufficient appropriate 
evidence’ to be able to draw reasonable conclusions on which to base their opinion. That 
opinion assures users that the financial statements give a ‘true and fair view’ of the financial 
position and performance of an entity. However, verifying litigation and claims under 
prevailing law and standards presents impediments for auditors to fulfill their obligations 
without compromising their client’s commercial position when litigation and claims exist. 
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